Rubio’s First Trip as Secretary Targets China, Migration, and the Panama Canal
Nov, 20 2025
When Marco Rubio stepped off the plane in Panama City on February 1, 2025, he wasn’t just visiting a capital—he was stepping into the heart of a geopolitical battleground. As Rubio’s first international trip as Secretary of State, this six-day tour through Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic wasn’t ceremonial. It was a declaration: the Trump administration’s America First policy is now firmly rooted in the Western Hemisphere. And it’s targeting three things: migration, Chinese infrastructure, and the future of U.S. influence.
Why the Panama Canal Matters More Than Ever
The Panama Canal isn’t just a waterway—it’s a $35 billion-a-year artery of global trade. And for the first time in years, Washington is treating it like the strategic chokepoint it is. Rubio’s meetings in Panama City zeroed in on two Chinese giants: COSCO Shipping Ports Limited, which operates the Balboa and Cristóbal ports at either end of the canal, and China Communications Construction Company, building the $1.8 billion Puente Atlántico bridge and the $1.3 billion subway tunnel. Together, these projects represent over $3.1 billion in Chinese investment—much of it tied to long-term operational control.President José Raúl Mulino, who took office in July 2024 after winning 34.4% of the vote, made his stance clear: Panama won’t negotiate sovereignty. "The canal is ours," he said in a televised address days before Rubio’s arrival. But he also signaled openness to deeper U.S. security cooperation. That’s the tightrope walk: resisting Chinese encroachment without alienating Beijing entirely.
Stopping the Flow Through the Darién Gap
While the canal grabs headlines, the real human crisis is unfolding in the jungle. The Darién Gap, a 66-mile stretch of rainforest between Yaviza, Panama and Turbo, Colombia, became the deadliest migration corridor on Earth in 2024. Over 500,000 people—mostly from Venezuela, Haiti, and Ecuador—crossed it, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. Many paid criminal gangs to guide them through rivers, cliffs, and venomous snakes. Some didn’t make it.Rubio’s team pushed for coordinated patrols and intelligence sharing with Panamanian forces. The U.S. has now formally designated the Tren de Aragua gang and the Los Choneros cartel as foreign terrorist organizations under President Trump’s January 25, 2025 executive order. That’s not just symbolic—it unlocks new tools: asset freezes, travel bans, and military cooperation.
"The people crossing the Darién aren’t just migrants," said a senior State Department official who spoke on background. "They’re fueling a criminal economy that’s bigger than most Central American economies. We’re not just stopping bodies—we’re breaking networks."
Countering China, One Port at a Time
The Chinese infrastructure push isn’t limited to Panama. In the Dominican Republic, Beijing has financed ports and telecom networks. In El Salvador, Chinese firms are building data centers under "digital sovereignty" agreements. The pattern is clear: low-interest loans, opaque contracts, and long-term operational rights.Rubio’s countermove? Economic partnerships with real teeth. In Panama City, he met with executives from Cargill, Coca-Cola, and Caterpillar—all ready to expand operations if regulatory clarity improves. The message: U.S. investment isn’t just about dollars—it’s about transparency, labor standards, and environmental accountability.
"China offers money," said a Panamanian business leader at the Centro Empresarial. "America offers a future. We’re choosing the future."
What Comes Next
By March 15, 2025, U.S. and Panamanian authorities plan to launch joint migration coordination centers at key entry points along the Darién Gap. The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, led by Assistant Secretary Brian Nichols, has already begun drafting follow-up visits for the next six months—this time focused on economic accords with Costa Rica and Guatemala.Meanwhile, analysts at the Atlantic Council note this trip marks a turning point. After years of inconsistent U.S. engagement, the Trump administration is treating Latin America not as a problem to manage, but as a partner to empower. "This isn’t about dominance," said analyst Elena Torres. "It’s about relevance. And right now, the U.S. is winning back the conversation."
Why This Matters to You
If you’re wondering why a trip to Central America affects you: it’s because global trade routes, migration flows, and geopolitical power are all connected. A Chinese-controlled canal means longer shipping times, higher prices on your electronics and coffee. A broken migration system means more pressure on U.S. border resources and social services. And if the U.S. retreats from its hemisphere, other powers will rush in—with consequences we’ll feel at home.Frequently Asked Questions
How does this trip change U.S. policy toward Latin America?
For the first time since 2020, the U.S. is sending its top diplomat on a sustained, multi-country tour focused squarely on the Western Hemisphere. The emphasis on joint security operations, economic alternatives to Chinese loans, and formal counterterrorism designations signals a shift from reactive diplomacy to proactive regional leadership. This isn’t just about borders—it’s about rebuilding trust through action.
Why is China investing so heavily in Panama’s infrastructure?
China sees the Panama Canal as a critical node in its Belt and Road Initiative. Controlling key ports and transport links gives Beijing leverage over global shipping lanes—especially as U.S.-China tensions rise. COSCO’s operation of both canal terminals means China can influence cargo prioritization, delays, and even data flows. It’s economic influence disguised as infrastructure.
What’s the real impact of designating Tren de Aragua and Los Choneros as terrorist organizations?
It allows U.S. agencies to freeze assets, block financial transactions, and share intelligence with partner nations under counterterrorism laws. Previously, these gangs were treated as criminal organizations—now they’re treated like Al-Qaeda or ISIS. That means U.S. military advisors can train Panamanian forces directly, and drone strikes or special ops may become options. It’s a legal game-changer.
Will this trip lead to more U.S. military presence in Central America?
Not necessarily. The focus is on training, intelligence, and joint patrols—not bases. But with over 500,000 migrants crossing the Darién in 2024, the U.S. may expand its use of drone surveillance and mobile border units. The goal isn’t occupation—it’s disruption. Think of it as a high-tech fence made of data, not steel.
How are local governments responding to U.S. pressure on China?
Most are cautiously supportive. Leaders like President Mulino want U.S. support but don’t want to provoke China. They’re playing both sides: accepting Chinese investment for infrastructure while quietly welcoming U.S. security aid. The U.S. is betting that economic alternatives—like American-made ports with better labor practices—will eventually outcompete Chinese deals. So far, the gamble is paying off.
What happens if Panama refuses to limit Chinese operations at the canal?
The U.S. won’t force a confrontation. Instead, it will deepen ties with other regional partners—like Colombia and Costa Rica—to create alternative trade corridors. It’s a long game: if the U.S. can offer faster, more reliable, and transparent logistics, businesses will naturally shift away from Chinese-controlled hubs. The canal isn’t going anywhere, but its dominance might.